On 31 March 1806 -following Pitt's death and the formation of the "Ministry of All the Talents" -the Attorney General, Sir A. Pigott, introduced a bill that sought to prevent British subjects from supplying slaves to the territories of foreign powers, as well as seeking means to make the August 1805 Order more effective. At its third reading, Pigott's bill was passed by 35 votes to 13. The motion was brought to the House of Lords on 7 May and, one week later, approved with a majority of 25 votes. As there was insufficient parliamentary time available that session to move another motion on the slave trade -this time prohibiting the import of slaves into British territories -Charles James Fox and Grenville decided to confine themselves to outlining the general principles of a future bill, leaving the final parliamentary battle for the following session.
1.
Charles James Fox (1749 Fox ( -1806 , styled "The Honourable" from 1762, British Whig politician and statesman, the second surviving son of Henry Fox (1705 Fox ( -1774 , 1st Baron Holland of Fox, and Lady Georgiana Caroline Fox (1723-1774) Although credit for the Act for the abolition of the slave trade belongs mainly to Fox and Grenville, the author of the global abolition system was actually William Wilberforce, the independent, though Tory inclined, member for Yorkshire and widely regarded as the leader of the Evangelical movement. During the debates in the Commons on 10 June 1806, Wilberforce had submitted a motion urging "his majesty to take such measures as in his wisdom he shall judge proper, for establishing by negotiation with foreign powers, a concert and agreement for abolishing the African Slave Trade". (Wilberforce 603) Although apparently innocent and passing almost unnoticed at the time, Wilberforce's motion revolutionised British foreign policy and even the nature of international relations itself. The notion of creating a broad consensus between the powers around a common humanitarian ideal, abolition of the slave, was certainly a daring concept.
The implications of second part of Wilberforce's motion, suggesting "assistance mutually towards carrying into execution any regulations which may be adopted by any or all of the contracting parties for accomplishing their common purpose", remain controversial. (ibidem; see also Clarkson 2, 525) In effect, "humanitarian grounds" might now be used to legitimise interference in the affairs of other states. Wilberforce's motion opened the way for Palmerston's intrusive foreign policies and, more generally, for modern "democratic interventionism" -which may provide a cover for the realisation of more selfish objectives. After a conference between the two Houses on 15 June 1806, Grenville agreed to bring the subject of Wilberforce's motion to the House of Lords. Accordingly, on 24 June 1806, Grenville submitted a motion for an address to the Throne "beseeching His Majesty to take measures for establishing, by negotiation with foreign powers, a concert and agreement for abolishing the African Slave Trade", which was carried without a division. (Grenville apud It was Lord Holland who accepted responsibility for enforcingJefferson's refusal to ratify the compact invalidated the whole scheme. (Holland, Motion on the "African Slave Trade" 748-9) Following Fox's death, Holland continued the attempt to enforce Wilberforce's system. As Williams notes, however, it was not until 1823 that "emancipation became the avowed aim of the abolitionists", achieved one decade later. (Williams 182 ) From 1807 to 1814, already in opposition, Holland strove to persuade British governments to put more pressure on states still involved in the slave trade -not least Portugal -to give up the morally unsupportable trade in human beings and to cooperate with Britain to achieve its world-wide abolition. 6 Perhaps inadvertently, Holland was introducing a discordant note into Anglo-Portuguese relations that was to last at least until 1842, almost two years after his own death -when an AngloPortuguese treaty for mutual cooperation in the suppression of the slave trade was finally concluded.
Holland's involvement in the establishment and enforcement of the abolition system was most significant between 1806 and 1814. His later parliamentary interventions on the subject were brief and of little political relevance, including a speech in the House of Lords on 23 February 1818, "praying that the colonial assemblies in the West Indies might be urged to adopt such measures as might be most effectual for preventing any traffic in slaves", (Holland, speech on the "Slave Trade" 575) which "subject had received from his majesty's ministers that attention which it so justly merited." (Bathurst 575 ) But despite Holland's loathing of the slave trade, "one of the greatest evils to which the human race has ever been exposed", his role in the abolition of slavery itself was more ambiguous. (Holland, Memoirs 158) Slavery faced Holland with personal and political dilemmas. He felt morally obliged to follow the position adopted by his uncle and embraced by the Whigs, yet he had also to be mindful of his own 6.
Holland was among the members of the African Institution, a Society formed on 14 Apr. 1807. Its primary object was "to promote the Abolition of the African Slave Trade by Foreign Powers", especially Portugal, who "alone will remain to oppose or obstruct any efforts which may be made for the improvement of Africa." (Report 48) interests as the proprietor of sugar plantations in Jamaica, 7 which Lady Holland had inherited from her father, Richard Vassall. (Chancellor 263) 8 These estates, which in good years could produce profits of £7,000, were worked by slaves. In 1833, on the eve of emancipation, there were 328 slaves on the estates, which produced about 200 tons of sugar per year. (Highman 105 ) Dependency on the income from Jamaica became obvious in 1821, when crop failure in the West Indies forced painful economies, including reductions in staff and in spending on dinners and parties. Towards the end of 1821, the situation was so desperate that the closure of Holland and Ampthill Houses became a serious possibility. As Lady Holland wisely observed, "Open doors brings open mouths." (Vassall apud Ilchester, Chronicles 25) Signs of improvement at the start of 1822 allowed entertainments to be resumed in March, though on a smaller scale. 9 In the last resort, the elegant salon of Holland House, where there was such polished conversation and so many high ideals were expounded, was founded on slavery; without the forced labour of Africans shipped across the Atlantic in appalling conditions, it simply could not have existed.
As Leslie Mitchell notes, Holland's reliance on income from the Jamaican estates, "made his position on slavery potentially anomalous." (Mitchell 91) Holland's ambiguity on the matter emerges in a motion submitted to the House of Lords on 27 June 1816, when peers debated Bussa's Rebellion, a slave insurrection that had broken out in Barbados on Easter Sunday (14 April). While stressing his desire "to promote the happiness and improvement of the black population," Holland urged strong measures to "protect the lives and fortunes of the white population of the West Indies by removing erroneous impressions which had been made on the minds of the negroes." (Holland, motion Towards the end of 1823, extensive repairs were undertaken at Holland House, forcing the family to live for a while in the Duke of Bedford's house in St James Square and later at Brighton. The repairs suggest that the financial crisis was over. (Ilchester, Chronicles 33, 43) Holland into an awkward position. As Mitchell observes, "the uncompromising views enunciated by Charles Fox inevitably look odd in the mouth of a slave-owner, even if that slave owner was supporting measures to his own financial detriment." (Mitchell 90) Holland attempted to resolve his dilemmas by making a distinction between abolition (of the slave trade) and outright emancipation, claiming that "whilst on the one hand it was essentially just that the trade should be abolished, it would on the other be injustice to the slaves to give them emancipation, because it could only tend to their own injury." (Holland, speech on the "Slave Trade Abolition Bill" 682) But this made little impression on either abolitionists or anti-abolitionists. Perhaps the Duke of Norfolk 10 had Holland in mind when during an abolition debate in the Lords on 23 March 1807, he had declared that "he knew that many of those who were loudest in its praise [of the abolition], were far from being sincere in their wishes for its success." (Norfolk 170) An anonymous letter from a West Indian published in Cobbett's Political Register for 1807, claimed that at Montego Bay on 9 October 1806 -admittedly through his agent -Holland had purchased several slaves who had been brought from Africa on the Perseus. The author concluded:
It was no repugnance to dealing in human blood (…) that caused Lord Holland to come forward as an advocate for the abolition, for he was himself become a purchaser of his fellow creatures, and still holds them in slavery.
No, Sir, it was because he found he could follow his own party in the pursuit of popularity, without injuring his own possessions …. (3, 17 Jan. 1807: 82) Perhaps to alleviate his own conscience, Holland tried to ensure that his slaves had better conditions than those working on other plantations. In a speech in the Lords on 4 February 1819, Holland supported a motion to ascertain the extent to which colonial legislatures had adopted recommendations approved in Parliament on 27
June 1816 and designed to improve the living conditions of slaves. In particular, he urged the authorities in other colonies to attend to the moral and religious education of slaves by following the example of the Jamaican Assembly, which in 1818 had passed an Act "to provide for the appointment of twenty curates to give religious instruction to the Negroes, at the rate of 300l. currency each per annum." (Holland, address on "Slaves in the West India Islands" 849) Holland mentioned that he had ordered churches and schools to be built on his own estates in Jamaica. (Mitchell 101) 11 During a tour of the West Indies in 1837 to inspect conditions under "apprenticeship" -the intermediate stage before full emancipation -Joseph Sturge and Thomas Harvey interviewed about sixty people employed on the Hollands' Friendship plantation in the presence of their attorney and overseer.
12 Although those Sturge and Harvey spoke to were not very communicative, They said, however, that they had a kind master and mistress (Lord and Lady Holland); and, when free, which they wished might be to-morrow, they should be glad to remain on the estate and work for wages, rather than leave their houses and grounds to begin the world again. (Anon. 147) Of course it is difficult to ascertain whether these opinions were genuine or merely the product of fear of what the overseer might do once Sturge and Harvey had gone away.
Yet, it may be unfair to accuse Holland of hypocrisy. On closer analysis, it seems likely that his commitment to abolition was genuine -as indeed were virtually all of his political initiatives, standing as they did in what Mitchell calls the tradition of the Whig tradition of "impeccable Whiggism." (Mitchell 99) According to Mitchell, despite its financial dependency upon slavery, "Holland House was firmly abolitionist." (ibidem) While "Holland stayed true to the legacy of his uncle", (ibidem 102) he believed that precipitate emancipation would do the slaves more harm than good. Thus he acknowledged the "evils of the 11. See Mitchell, Holland House, 101. 12. Joseph Sturge (1793 -1859 , English anti-slavery writer and member of the Religious Society of Friends or Quakers.
state of slavery", yet insisted that "it was not possible there could be a sudden and rapid passage from that condition, to the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the British constitution." (Holland, motion upon the "West Indies Slaves" 1272) Further, emancipation must not be at the expense of the proprietors who deserved proper compensation. Holland's political diaries for the years 1831-40, while he was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, provide some idea of his views on the slave question. At Christmas 1831, a major slave revolt, known as the Baptist War, broke out in Jamaica. Originally promoted as a peaceful strike by the Baptist Minister Samuel Sharpe, the movement degenerated into violent rebellion with, as Holland reported in his diary, "great loss of life, severe executions and the destruction of 52 estates." (Holland, The Holland House Diaries 136) In the circumstances, the obvious course might have been to take harsh measures to deter other islands from following the Jamaican example, but the British government decided to appoint a Committee to inquire into the state of the West Indian slave population. The Committee was chaired by the Duke of Richmond and Holland was among the members, all of whom were West Indian proprietors -supposedly better acquainted with the problems of slavery. Unsurprisingly, this arrangement was heavily criticised by abolitionists.
13 Despite Holland's good will and assurances of neutrality, the public was unlikely to see him as a model of impartiality, since he was widely seen as a leader of the West India lobby.
14 As Dr Lushington observed at the general meeting of the Anti-Slavery Society, held at Exeter Hall on 12 May 1832, the members of the Committee for the West Indies, including Holland, had been selected "as judges just in proportion to the interest they had in the matter before them." (Lushington 160) A Letter from Legion to His Grace the Duke of Richmond, published anonymously in 1832, accused the Committee of being "the 13. On 24 May 1832, upon the presentation of a petition signed by 135,000 people resident in the London area, praying for the abolition of slavery at the earliest period, Edward Harbord, 3rd Baron Suffield, a radical and an anti-slavery campaigner, accused the Parliament of trying to throw a veil over the subject through the appointment of a puppet commission. Holland came to the defence of the committee, arguing that "his impression was, that it was appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the subject, and for looking at both sides of the question." (Speech on the "Slavery in the Colonies" 14) 14. In 1837, Holland became a founder member of the Society of West Indian Planters. (Mitchell 96, 98) unconscious murders of their fellow-creatures" and the promoters of "a system of oppression and death." (4-5)
Holland realised that sooner or later "slavery was to cease in our West Indian colonies", (Holland, motion upon the "West Indies Slaves" 1271) but he also wanted compromise between the slave owners and their critics. 15 Hence, while giving full support to the bill emancipating slaves in all British dominions passed in the Lords on 20 August 1833 at the third reading, he insisted that emancipation must "be accompanied with some practical means of maintaining the police [peace?] and the relations between various orders of society without which property cannot subsist." (Durham University Library, Earl Grey Family Papers, MSS Box 111, Holland to Howick (4 Jan. 1833), apud Mitchell 97) While Holland had a personal interest in all of this, it should not be forgotten that the sanctity of private property was a central tenet of the Whig tradition. 16 Rather than immediate emancipation -seen as likely to lead to violence and economic dislocation -an Apprenticeship Scheme, proposed by Edward Stanley, was adopted, probably at Holland's suggestion. The scheme, which meant that former slaves could not yet leave their plantations, was supposed to give proprietors and apprentices time to adjust to the new arrangements, but was not a complete success. It did not prevent proprietors from abusing their half-emancipated work force, who were left more vulnerable than before. As in the case of his ideas and day to day position on issues surrounding the Spanish constitution, Holland's position on slavery was essentially pragmatic. Mitchell sees this as an example of "the unusual role of pragmatists moderating the aspirations of idealists." (Ibidem 97) Of course, there is a bleaker interpretation: that Holland's role on 15. Anti-abolitionists were headed by the Marquess of Chandos (1797-1861) should be awarded to the planters as compensation.
the slave question reveals a fundamental contradiction within Whig thought. In short, how could Whigs like Holland survive the end of slavery when their own existence as a class depended on it? Yet if they disappeared from the political scene, how could they stand up for human rights and liberties? Neither the Whigs nor Lord Holland ever gave honest answers to these questions. The slave question is perhaps the most striking example of the fragility inherent in the Whig tradition, and Holland House the best symbol of this fragility. It was a grand centre of abolitionism yet its grandeur was sustained by the very thing the abolitionists wished to destroy. A house built on such paradoxical foundations could not hope to last much longer.
As pioneer in the epic adventure of discoveries, Portugal was the first European country to develop an extensive trade in African slaves. (Blake 95) Even at the end of the eighteenth century, Portugal was responsible for about 25% of the transatlantic slave trade, a figure only exceeded by Britain. (Marques 9 ) 17 Portugal's involvement in the slave trade had begun as early as the second quarter of the fifteenth century, in the days of Henry the Navigator, when Moroccans, Guanches (inhabitants of the Canary Isles) and Africans from Guinea and Angola were imported into Madeira to work in the sugar plantations. (Saunders 4; Miguel 421-2; Azzimani 59-68) In his Chronicle of Guinea, Gomes Eanes de Zurara provided an impressive description of the separation of slaves from their families and redistribution in lots. According to Zurara, "the Infant [D. Henrique] was there, mounted upon a powerful steed, and accompanied by his retinue, making distribution of his favours, as a man who sought to gain but small treasure from his share." (i, 82-3) 18 The first African slaves arrived in metropolitan Portugal in 1441 and soon became a crucial element in the economy. system. On 15 April, he instructed Lord Strangford, 25 British Minister at Lisbon, to "represent to the Portuguese Ministers, the general benefit that would result from the accession of the Government of Portugal, to the fullest extent of the measures which the British Legislature (…) has finally determined to adopt." ("Copy of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning" 629; see also Bandinel 126) To this challenge, Araújo duly replied that "he had no difficulty in declaring, that such a measure was utterly impracticable at present". And, sarcastically alluding to the English system, he declared that "there were no means of collecting public opinion in this country", (Azevedo apud Strangford 629; see also Marques 10) thus it would be impossible to determine whether the Portuguese were favourable or against the abolition of slave trade. (Bethell 6) Of all the topics discussed in Holland's memorandum to Domingos de Sousa Coutinho, the future Conde do Funchal, on the transference of the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro in 1807, the issue of the slave trade was the most sensitive. (Holland, "Carta ou memoria" 249-56) 26 Holland's own position, a slave owner who disapproved of slavery, was complex. Despite the fair prospects Holland identifies for Brazil, there is no escaping the fact that its economy is dependent on slavery. Holland fears that such dependence may increase, perhaps through Rio becoming the main centre of the trade for the whole of South America. His denunciation is forthright: "this human scourge, the traffic in negroes (…) a commerce which is little more than detestable in its principles and more dangerous in its excesses." (Ibidem 255) He insists that any increase in the number of slaves will harm the spirit of the country and Brazil's reputation as a rising state. Steps must be taken to discourage the trade -through preachers, through the press and commercial disincentives. Holland warns starkly that if nothing is done, "the House of Braganza will not be transported to a rising empire, to a new Portugal, but rather to the horrors of St Dominic, to the slaughter of Cap Français." (Ibidem) Yet despite the rhetoric, Holland's recommendations are modest. He acknowledges that it may be difficult to ban the trade outright and, for reasons explained elsewhere in the memorandum, he is anxious not to upset the owners of large estates. They are opposed to abolition and it would be unwise to inflict heavy financial losses upon them. The best course would be to ban the import and export of slaves and then indemnify the merchants involved by granting them a monopoly on the internal trade, excluding all foreigners, especially the English. Various steps could be taken to decrease the evils of slavery, including improving the slaves' conditions and promoting forms of agriculture that "require fewer slaves and more horses." (Ibidem 256) Holland's stress on 'choosing the right moment' once more reveals the pragmatic side to his character: (…) you should remember that while this traffic continues, it will be impossible to improve the social order or to make their customs closer to those of the Europeans, which is what can guarantee the tranquillity of the state, the happiness and civilisation of the people. It is thus necessary to look forward and choose the right moment for breaking the whole pact with evil; but if you will not dare to move directly towards this end, all your steps must at least move in this direction. (Ibidem) Unfortunately, as Soriano noted, although some of Holland's suggestions were contemplated by the Portuguese Ministers, "they only adopted the worst that it contained" and this did not include the interdiction of slave trade, which continued flourishing throughout the following decades. (Soriano, note to Holland's "Carta ou memoria" 256)
The French invasion of Portugal in 1807 and subsequent reliance upon Britain for the recovery of her independence, gave the Portuguese Government little room for manoeuvre. Between 1808 and 1820, when British forces left following the Liberal revolution (24 Aug. 1820), Portugal was virtually a British protectorate and thus unable to refuse any requests from Britain. On 17 April 1808, Canning instructed Lord Strangford, who had accompanied the Portuguese Royal Family to Rio de Janeiro in November 1807, to urge the Prince Regent to adhere to the abolition system or, at least, to prevent Portuguese traders from furnishing slaves to other nations and to include the issue in "any Treaty which shall contain the final arrangements of the relations of the two countries." ("Copy of a Dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning" 630) In contrast to his earlier blunt response, Araújo now gave reluctant consent to the British demands. Accordingly, an Anglo-Portuguese treaty of alliance and friendship was signed at Rio de Janeiro on 19 February 1810 between Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho and Lord Strangford. 27 Under Article X, the Prince Regent agreed "to cooperate with His Britannic Majesty in the cause of humanity and justice, by adopting the most efficacious means for bringing about a gradual abolition of the slave trade throughout the whole of His dominions." ("Tratado de Alliança e Amizade" 407, 409) The Article also stated that Portuguese subjects were not For Holland, Portugal represented a greater problem than Spain, because in the first case "the trade was carried on from one Portuguese port in Africa to another Portuguese port in the Brazils." (Holland, motion on the "African Slave Trade" 748) To overcome the problem, the British Government had proposed to purchase "the Portuguese territory in Africa, which would have placed the subject upon a totally different footing." (Ibidem) Although Holland welcomed the idea of purchase, it must have alarmed the Portuguese authorities who were unwilling to surrender more of their Empire to Britain. But the most controversial feature of Holland's motion -one responsible for much of the later friction between Britain and Portugal -was the proposal that nations should "authorize the treating all those persons as pirates who persisted, in defiance of all reason, justice, and humanity, in trading in human flesh." (Ibidem 749) On 6 December 1813, more than three and a half years after his motion had been accepted by the House of Lords, Holland regretted "that so little progress had been made in the attempt to prevent the practice of carrying on the slave trade under foreign flags." (Holland, address on the "Slave Trade" 243) Holland considered Castlereagh's initial efforts in the various discussions at the end of the Napoleonic wars far from satisfactory; the Foreign Secretary had lost an opportunity to force others nations, such as Louis XVIII's France, into "agreeing that they would neither commence nor revive a commerce, confessedly founded in barbarity and injustice." (Holland, In return for Portuguese good will and cooperation, Britain agreed to remit the "payments as may then remain due and payable upon the Loan of £600,000, made in London for the service of Portugal, in the year 1809." (Ibidem) And by a secret clause, Britain also agreed to compensate Portugal for all Portuguese slave vessels detained by mistake by the British Navy after 1 June 1814. (Bandinel 152) An additional clause to the 1815 treaty, signed in London on 28 July 1817 also between Palmela and Castlereagh, introduced an instrument of mutual control to "prevent their respective subjects from carrying on an illicit slave trade." ("Convenção addicional ao tratado de 22 de Janeiro 1815" 327) Portuguese traders were, however, allowed to continue trafficking slaves on the East Coast of Africa, between Cape Delgado and the Bay of Lourenço Marques, and on the West Coast between 8º and 18º south, and from the 5º 12" to 8º south. (Ibidem 329) This treaty also allowed ships flying the Portuguese flag to import slaves from Africa to Brazil, provided they carried a royal passport written in English and Portuguese according to a pre-established model. (Ibidem 329, 331 ) Perhaps the most important clause -whose consequences were to be felt many years later -was the introduction of a right to mutually inspect "such merchant vessels of the two Nations, as may be suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of having slaves on board acquired by an illicit traffic". If the suspicions were confirmed, the offenders "may be brought to trial before the tribunals established for this purpose, as shall hereinafter be specified." (Ibidem 331) Despite the repeated reference to both parties, this clause was obviously designed to allow Britain to supervise Portuguese shipping. The provision that Portuguese warships might stop British merchant ships was purely theoretical.
It was not until the 1830's, when Palmerston was at the Foreign Office, that Britain systematically applied -sometimes abusively -the "stop and search" clause in response to the increasing numbers of African slaves taken to Brazil aboard overcrowded ships flying the Portuguese flag. Anticipating the complete abolition of the slave trade after the conclusion of an Anglo-Brazilian treaty in 1826, traders decided to "stock up" on slaves before it was too late, leading to a drastic increase of the traffic. (Alexandre 295) Unlike Britain, where a bill had been introduced on 21 July 1806 to prevent traders from taking more slaves before the total abolition of the traffic, neither the Brazilian nor the Portuguese authorities had shown the least concern.
30 According to this treaty, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 23 November 1826 and operative from 13 March 1830 -i.e. three years after its ratification -the traffic in slaves was not only illegal for Brazilians but was also to be treated as an act of piracy. ("Convenção 30. According to this Bill, passed in the British Parliament on 21 June 1806, vessels were not allowed to load with slaves from 1 Aug. 1806 unless it had been previously employed by the same owners in the trade or if it could be proved that it had been already contracted for this purpose prior to 10 June 1806. ("Slave Ship Restriction Bill", 1143-5; see also Clarkson 2, 563; Bandinel 119) entre o Senhor D. Pedro I" 391) To overcome this provision, slave traders made over their ships to a Portuguese national when they reached the coast of Africa and, once the slaves had been acquired, the vessels could sail to Brazil or Cuba under nominal Portuguese ownership. Of course the "flagging" scheme would not have been possible without the connivance of the Brazilian authorities and the complicity of the Portuguese colonial administrators, who were responsible for supplying the necessary documents. (Alexandre 296-8; see also Bethell 97) Here it must be noted that it was not the Portuguese Government, but rather Brazilian traders, who were responsible for systematic evasion; nor did the Portuguese have the resources to prevent such evasion. Yet it was Portugal that the British authorities now accused of prevaricating. (Alexandre 301) Thus Palmerston decided that existing Anglo-Portuguese treaties on the slave trade must be revised in a way that would force Portugal to make a clearer commitment to its eradication. On 13 February 1832, Palmerston instructed Richard Hoppner, British Agent at Lisbon, to urge the Portuguese Government "to issue a declaration announcing the final and total abolition of the Portuguese Slave Trade, and their determination to suppress it, according to the terms of the additional Article to the Treaty of 1817." ("Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Hoppner" 11) 31 Despite several interviews with the Visconde de Santarém, Miguel's Foreign Minister, Hoppner only secured a vague promise that Santarém would put the question to his colleagues. 32 thus more easily pressurised on the slave trade. The political instability that followed the establishment of the Liberal regime and the premature death of D. Pedro IV on 24 September 1834, further weakened the Portuguese position.
33
Following the reestablishment of constitutionalism and the accession of Maria II on 20 September 1834, Palmela was made responsible for negotiations on the slave trade. 34 Palmela had been appointed head of a Cabinet that lasted until 4 May 1835, when he was replaced by Vitório de Sousa Coutinho, second Conde de Linhares. 35 A few days later, on 27 May, however, Palmela became Foreign Minister in a Government led by the Marquês de Saldanha, 36 which survived until 18 November 1835. (Carvalho 3, Even after leaving office, Palmela continued to lead negotiations with the British but now as a Plenipotentiary. Unlike his predecessors, whose manifest reluctance to abolish the slave trade had been often criticised by the British, Palmela realised that its end was inevitable and hence decided to try to secure the best possible terms. Palmela had no doubt that his strategy was right, later describing his time as a negotiator as "perhaps one of the periods in my life in which I had the fortune to pay the greatest service to the Country." (Palmela, Memórias 302) During his years in London between 1813 and 1820, Palmela would have realised the strength of the abolitionist movement and may well have discussed it when visiting Holland House.
37
But despite Palmela's willingness to reach a settlement, the political situation in Portugal made progress difficult. The country was just emerging from civil war and facing growing financial problems and so it is hardly surprising that abolition of the slave trade was not seen as a high priority. Lord Howard de Walden, British Minister in Lisbon, 38 had to wait nine months before the Portuguese authorities agreed to discuss the issue. (Bandinel 217 ) Several rounds of negotiations held between 1835 and 1836 produced no tangible results and Howard de Walden began to complain of Portuguese reluctance to cooperate.
39
Palmela himself went as far as to work on a project for a treaty that would lead to the total abolition of the slave trade in all Portuguese dominions, but this was frustrated by cabinet changes. In the end, all that the British Minister could obtain from Palmela was a circular to all Portuguese consulates, dated 22 October 1835, with instructions for the strict observance of existing anti-slavery legislation and for the application of any measures necessary to enforce it. A new round of negotiations began in the summer 1836 but was again interrupted following the coup d'état of 9 September 1836, leading not only to a change of ministers but also to the establishment of Setembrismo, a progressive regime that lasted until 1842. The accession of Sá da Bandeira to the cabinet on 10 September -first as Foreign Minister and then, from 5 November 1836, as President of the Council of Ministers -brought a new sense of urgency to the slave trade question. 40 On 19 February 1836, while Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas Territories, Sá da Bandeira had submitted a report to the Chamber of Deputies arguing that investment in the colonies would be useless unless the slave trade was abolished -because capital would continue to be redirected to the latter rather than to the former. A few days later, on 26 March, Sá da Bandeira submitted a bill to the Chamber of Peers for the abolition of slave trade in all Portuguese dominions and for the introduction of heavy penalties for those breaking this law, either directly or indirectly. But Sá da Bandeira's bill was opposed by Peers who said they feared disturbances in the colonies. The proposal was referred to a commission which never got round to reporting on it. (Diario do Governo 101 (26 Mar. 1836): 561)
After the establishment of the Setembrista regime and the dissolution of Parliament, a few months elapsed before the convocation of a new legislature. 41 On 10 December 1836, taking advantage of this virtual dictatorship, Sá da Bandeira passed a law abolishing the slave trade in all Portuguese dominions. ("Decreto de 10 de Dezembro de 1836" 460-66) This was followed by another, passed on 16 January 1837, restricting the use of the Portuguese flag. It has been argued that Sá da Bandeira's legislation was not serious and Palmerston described it as "mere mockery". ("Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden" 32) But, if not entirely without foundation, this view seems exaggerated and unfair. It seems clear that, while taking 40. Like Palmela, Sá da Bandeira had lived in England for some time -first as a student in 1825-6 and then as an exile in 1828-9 during Miguel's usurpation. It is likely that it was while he was in Britain that Sá da Bandeira encountered abolitionist movements, to whose principles he adhered and later tried to introduce in Portugal. 41. The Cortes Constituintes summoned for the first time on 18 Jan. 1837. the initiative in the negotiations, Sá da Bandeira's was trying to anticipate the next British move. His commitment to the abolition of the slave trade can be demonstrated by his political initiatives and was even acknowledged by Howard de Walden, who admitted that "the Decree of the 10th December has already produced beneficial effects," ("Lord Howard de Walden to Viscount Palmerston" 31) and by Mr Jerningham, 42 the British Chargé d'Affaires at Lisbon, in several of his dispatches to Palmerston. 43 But taking the lead in negotiations, as Sá da Bandeira intended, implied that Portugal had sufficient determination and resources to eradicate or at least drastically reduce the slave trade in her African territories. Thus, Sá da Bandeira had to stop the "flagging" scheme, which meant taking on Portuguese and foreign slave traders and curbing corruption among colonial administrators. 44 Whatever their author's good intentions, Sá da Bandeira's laws proved ineffective, so much so that they could not even prevent a significant expansion of the slave trade. Hence, Palmerston concluded that the only way to ensure serious Portuguese cooperation in the abolition of the slave trade would be to apply a degree of coercion. (Bethell 105) On 28 April 1838, Palmerston instructed Howard de Walden to "obtain from the Portuguese Government a distinct and formal declaration, whether they will, or not, conclude that Treaty." ("Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden" 34) Although Portugal did not necessarily object to the conclusion of a new Anglo-Portuguese treaty, Sá da Bandeira had his own agenda and problems.
The following months were marked by a series of advances and setbacks, with several proposals and counter-proposals from each party -accompanied with quasi ultimata from Britain followed by the usual procrastinations and promises of cooperation from Portugal. While Palmerston wanted to introduce principles like "piracy" when dealing with slave traders and "perpetuity" of treaties, Sá da Bandeira insisted that the right of mutual inspection should be restricted to vessels of war expressly authorised for that purpose and confined to within 100 miles from the Portuguese Western and Eastern African coasts, Madagascar, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the South American coasts.
("Contra-projecto de Tratado" 56-8; "Tratado convencionado" 103) But the more sensitive object of the negotiations, as Sá da Bandeira acknowledged in a dispatch of 6 October 1838, concerned "the guarantee which the undersigned required Great Britain should give Portugal, for maintaining her African dominions in due obedience for all the time the Treaty was to last." ("Viscount de Sá da Bandeira to Mr. Jerningham" 311) In the same dispatch, Sá da Bandeira officially communicated to the British authorities Portugal's refusal to accept terms he considered "repugnant to the liberty of the Portuguese nation, and to the independence of Her Majesty's Crown." (Ibidem 19) After seven years of fruitless negotiation Palmerston decided that the time for diplomacy was over and that action must be taken. On away -Brougham had expressed impatience at having to wait so long for Palmerston's bill to arrive from the Commons. As Holland also noted, "I am a much older Member of the House than the Noble and Learned Lord, and I can recollect very important bills being brought up at a much later hour." (Holland, speech on the "Portuguese Slave Trade Bill" 4363) The reason why Holland apparently lost interest in the slave trade question after 1814 is unclear, and the consequences of his earlier actions in the imposition of the global abolition system, though enormous, are obviously difficult to quantify. In the long term, however, Holland's role in imposing the abolition system on other nations certainly contributed to force Portugal to adhere to scheme and, by doing so, he may have helped to spare many lives.
Works Cited

I) Manuscripts
